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ABSTRACT 
Objective Indices of Disaster- Related Stress: 
The Mount St. Helens' Ashfall 
by 
Paul R. Adams, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1981 
Major Professor: Dr. Gerald R. Adams 
Department: Family and Human Development 
xii 
On May 18, 1980, the town of Othello, Washing ton was covered with 
volcanic ash from the Mount St. Helens eruption. Disaster research 
suggested that a natural disaster acted on impac ted populations as a 
major stressor and could result in such stress-related symptoms/ 
problems as anxiety, depression, alcohol abuse, family problems, etc. 
It was hypothesized that there would be an increase in the incidence 
of such symptoms/problems following the ashfall . Mos t previous 
research has relied on subjective accounts of victims, but data for 
this study came from selected objective indices such as mental health 
caseloads, welfare assistance grants , hospital admissions, police 
records, etc. Data \.;rere compared fo r a 12- month pre- disaster baseline, 
and a 7- month post - disaster period . Of the 34 indices examined, five 
showed significant post - disaster decreases, and nine failed to meet 
the c riterion fo r significance. Twent y indices sholved significant 
increases and these seemed t o clearly support the hypothesis . Two 
xiii 
rival hypo theses were explored as possible causal factors: local 
unemployment rates , and economic fac t o rs affecting agriculture. The 
disaster hypothesis fi t the observed data more precisely and seemed 
most logical as a probable causal agent. 
(]43 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On Sunday morning, May 18 , 1980 between 10:00 and 10:30 a.m . , 
residents of Othello, Washington, were intrigued by the rapid approac h 
of cloud masses of unusual color and of a fascinati ng shape and tex-
ture . PeopLe rushed fo r cameras to pho tograph what they later found 
oue were the heralds of an historic event. Fo r earlier that day , at 
8 : 32 a.m., Mt . Saint Helens had exploded in a massive volcanic e rup -
tion . Millions of tons of dirt and rock forming the mountain's peak 
were blown up, pulverized, and burned into a fine ash which poured out 
in a gigantic , boiling pi llar that ros e to a height of 60,000 feet . 
Prevailing winds caught the ash and car r ied it in an ever-widening path 
through central and eastern Washington, across the United States, and 
eventually around the entire circumference of the ea rth. 
By noon in Othello, the first intriguing c louds had given place 
to a dense , opaque pall, spreading from horizon to horizon. The dark-
ness was that of the post - twilight gloom that just precedes full night . 
It had the visibility one occasionally sees on a clear, moonless winter 
night when fresh snow blankets the earth, but it darkened gradually to 
full darkness by 1:00 p.m. The ash, meanwhile, had begun to fall . 
It came straight down thro ugh absolutely motionless air, the winds 
that carried it having passed high overhead . The ash was so fine and 
light at first . that while it could be easily seen , individual parti -
cles could not be felt . It later p r oved to have a smooth feel and 
texture similar to talcum powder . The ashfall increased in density and 
rate until it approximated a moderate snowfall . 
The ashfall continued through the afte rnoon and into the night. 
Local officials urged people, via the local radio station, to stay off 
the streets and to avoid getti ng ash into their eyes or lungs. No one 
knew anything about the possible effects of the ash. Was it: poison-
ous? caustic? acidic? radioactive? Would it cause: lung damage? 
eye problems? skin react ions/irritation? tissue inflammati on? What 
effect wou l d it have on : infants a nd small children? elderly people? 
people with asthma or existing r espiratory problems? pets? unpro-
tected livestock? Would it damage: car paint or finishes? homes? 
lawns and gardens? orchards? field crops? farm machinery? 
Questions were many, answers were initially non- existent. Only 
later did tentatiVe answers come, and those were often confusing and 
contradictory. Radio announcements from local officials asked, then 
pleaded , and finally demanded that people clear the streets. Traffic 
was limi ted to emergency vehic l es on l y. Reports came of numerous 
t ravelers st randed. Pleas were made for donations of food, bedding , 
and shelter. The Police and Sheriff's departments were innundated with 
r eq ues ts fo r help . The ashfall continued, the uncertainty continued, 
and tension mounted . 
During the nigh t the ashfall diminished, finally s t opping alto-
gethe r . Monday, May 19, dawned on a scene that was, to Othello resi -
dents, appalling in its actuality and fra ught with fearful potential 
in the multipliCity of unanswered questions. The entire area was 
buried in almost an inch and a half of fi ne gray volcanic ash. To 
those who weren't there that may not sound like much. To those who 
have been buried under several feet of snow, it may sound completely 
insignificant. But snow, even in quantity, is familiar and understand-
able . The ash was alien, forbidding, threatening in its unknown poten-
tial for harm . Thinking in terms of " radioactive fallout ll rather than 
!!snow lt may help 'Inon- victims " to empathize with the initial concern and 
fear generated in many people during those first ho ur s of gray- mantled 
uncertainty . 
There were other problems that surfaced later. Snow melts, the 
ash just lay there . It was everywhere, in neat rows atop the strands 
of barbed- wire fences, on the whole length of phone and power lines, 
even on cord as thin as that in clotheslines . It coated each leaf of 
every tree, bending and breaking l imbs as weight mo un ted . It smo t hered 
new spring flowe ~s, buried vegetables s prouti ng in garde n plots, ge ntly 
but relentlessly crushed down hundreds of acres of newly - mowed alfalfa 
and half grown winter wheat . Later chemical a nalyses of the ash varied 
(according to the site of the sample) in their measure of density, but 
ranged from estimates of 30- 40 tons dry- weight per acre for each half-
inch depth. At a depth of one to one and a half inches, that meant 
thousands of tons of ash in and on everything in Ot hello, with tens of 
thousands of tOllS in the surrounding farms, pastures, and foothills, 
waiting for the nex t good windstorm. 
On that fi r s t da y, peop l e were urge d by of f i c i al s to stay indoors 
until something , anything at all, was known abou t the ash and its pos -
sible effects, especially on human health . Hund r eds of experts were 
called upon for frantic round- the - clock efforts to come up with factual 
information, with practical suggestions for immediate crises, and with 
workable plans for the less immediate crises . Chemists, geologists, 
fie ld biologists, psychologist s , disaster researchers, physicians 
eme r gency services specialists, and agricultural experts of every sor t 
labored heroically . Local officials, police, specialists, and anyone 
e lse who thought he had a usable idea struggled e qually hard with all 
the things that couldn! t wait for the " experts". 
I n Othello normal activities halted totally. Roads in and out of 
town were closed, and remained virtually impassable for four days. 
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Ci ty traffic was still limi ted to emergency vehicles . All industry, 
all businesses, all stores, including grocery stores, were closed down . 
Schoo l s were closed (and remained so until the start of the next school 
year) . No town in the United St ates had ever before been covered with 
volcanic ash; no one had the slightest idea what to do about it. 
On May 21, 1980 the Governor of Washington, Dixie Ray, declared 
the area in the immediate vicinity of the volcano, and those counties 
buried in ash, as constituting a disaster area. It is worth noting in 
passing that Adams Coun t y, whe re Othello is located, was the only 
county in Washington to be completely cove r ed with ash. On May 22, 
1980 President Jimmy Carter confirmed the Governor's declaration of 
dis ast e r after his helicopter tour, and promised federal support to aid 
in the recovery. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEH 
Definition of Disaster 
Marks and Fritz (1954 , Vol. 1, p. 3) define a "disastrous event" 
as follows : 
1. The event affects a community of persons - - i.e., a collec-
tion of people who occupy a commo n territory and are bound 
t ogether in relatively permanent social relationsh ips. 
2 . The event confronts a large segment of the community with 
act ual danger or threats of danger and loss to cherished 
values and material objects . 
3. The event results in deaths , injuries , the destruction of 
property , an d other loss es and deprivations to the popula-
tion, e .g., the disruption of commu n ity utilities and other 
community services. 
4 . The direct and indirect consequences of the disaster affect 
a large proportion of the population in the community , i.e ., 
the repercussions are diffused throughout the community 
rather than fo cused on a particula r group or collection of 
individuals. 
Cisin and Cla rk (1962), while acknowledging this definition, 
stress the need to define "disaster" in a broader scope than the amount 
of destruction. They point out thac a major faccor in defining 
disas cer is the amount of disruption that occurs in human activities 
and the human response to the disaster. An earthquake occurring in 
mid- ocean might disturb a few shellfish, with no other Significant 
effect. An ea r thquake of the same magnitude , with its epicenter in 
a metropolitan area could be catastrophic in its consequences for 
huma n beings . Converse l y , a "false alarm" , or "hoax" , where there is 
no actual danger, but there is a perceived threat, can result in 
disaster behavior (Cantril, 1940). 
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The ashfall in Othello was designated as a lIdisaster" by both 
state and federal guidelines defining a "disaster area" for purposes of 
receiving aid . It meets the criteria specified by Marks and Fritz 
(1954) , although there were no deaths or injuries in Othello directly 
attributable to the ashfall. It also meets the amplified definition 
of Cisin and Clark (1962). The destruction and/or damage to property 
was considerable. The disruption of services , of business, of com-
munity life in general, was extensive. The projected financial cost 
of clean-up was staggering to a community of this size . The damage to 
local economy, which is agriculture based, was extensive and expec ted 
by many to continue past the immediate l osses (The Outlo o k, 1979 -
1980) . Recognizing too, that the perception of threat can, in and of 
itse l f, result in disaster behavior, the many un~nswered questions 
about the ashfall increased the magnitude of this particular disaster . 
The uncertainty regarding possible effects and consequences of the ash 
(as enumerated above) weighed heavily for many days after the actual 
ashfall, and over and above these questions was the very real fear that 
it might happen allover again. Each new eruption of the mountain 
renewed the fear, especially since the wind generally blows inland from 
west to east (The Outlook, 1979 - 19 80). 
Psycho-Social Studies of Disaster 
Tierney, Quarantelli, Baisden, Dynes , and Frederick (1979), in a 
recent literatu r e review, point out that disasters have historically 
been viewed in terms of destruction and loss . Only in the last 25 
years have social scientists, especially researchers, taken much 
interest in studying the sociological effects of disaster or those 
"aspects of life that are less obvious than bricks and mortar, streets 
and buildings" (Tierney, et at., 1979, p. 2). 
A report published by the Disaster Research Croup (1961) lists a 
total of one hundred and ten field studies of disaster completed to 
that year. These included: Tornadoes, fires and explosions, floods, 
hurricanes and typhoons, earthquakes, incidents involving poisonous or 
asphyxiating chemicals, epidemics or threatened outbreaks, airplane 
crashes , blizzards, mine disasters, miscellaneous emergencies, false 
alarms , and civil defense exercises. Research on disasters has 
expanded conSiderabl y since then however. The Disaster Research Cen-
ter, fou nded in 1963 at Ohio State University, has conducted almost 300 
disaster studies world-wide (Tierney, et ai., 1979). This figure does 
not include independent studies, or those done under the auspices of 
another sponsoring agency. With all this research, however, there is 
relatively little known about the effects of disasters on the psycho-
logical functioning of individuals (Tierney, et ai., 1979). Rathe r the 
research has historically focused on the effects of such things as 
warning systems and effectiveness, communica tions, informal support 
networks, organizational responses, organizational effectiveness, pro-
vision of medical services, civil defense response and effectiveness, 
military/civilian interactions, Red Cross intervention, formal versus 
informal networks and leadership, conflict during disaster, criminal 
behavior , t he role of religion and churches, group behavior under 
stress , rumor control, cross- cultural compa risions of disaster reac -
tions, the behavior and problems resulting from evacuation, the 
effects of relocation, age differences in response to disaster, and a 
host of other issues . The reader interested in specific topiCS could 
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use as source mate rial the " ORe Pub l ications List " (Disaster Resea r ch 
Center, Feb . , 1981) , and the annotated bibliography in Tierney, et al . , 
(1979) . 
Disaster a nd "Hental Illness" 
IIFolk wisdom" suggests that people do not respond well in the face 
of catas trophe (Taylor, Ross, and Quarantelli, 1976; Tierney, et al ., 
1979) . Tyhurst (195i) identified what he called a "disaster syndrome" 
charac t erized by grossly inappropriate behav ior , serious anxiety reac-
tions , major affective disturbance, or eve n psychosis in severe cases . 
Wilson (1962), in a somewhat dated review , has suggested that those few 
researchers who d i d have an interest in the psychological effect of 
disaster had been looking fo r potential links betwe en disaste r s and 
"mental illness ll as man ifested by psychopathology . He r epo rt s observa-
tions that "pathological symptomatology " occurs in ma ny "normal" people 
shortly after impact, but the symptoms are transient (e .g., two- three 
weeks). Tayior , et ai . , ( i 976) and Tierney , et ai ., (i979) cite numer-
ous instances of II folk wisdomll, newspaper and magaz ine articles, and 
even some "professional " opinions and articles which conc l ude that men-
tal illness (psychopathology) is an inevitable consequence of disas -
ters . Both groups poin t out , however, t hat extensive reviews of 
empirical studies of disa ste r s co nsistentl y fail to support this widely 
held belief . They con t e nd that the last two decade s of research seem 
to i ndicat e that widespread mental il l ness is not a major consequence 
of most disasters . They do cau t ion that there may be transient symp-
toms of lI emo tional disturbance". ( A co ntenti on supported by 
Birnbaum , Cop l on , & Scha r ff , (1 973]). 
9 
In an exemplary study of twelve U. S . towns, six impacted by some 
type of disaster, and six carefully selected control towns, Tierney, et 
a 1., (1979) found that requests for !!traditional" psychiatric services 
actually declined after a disaster. This is supported by Taylor, et 
al . , (1976) in their study DE the Zenia tornado . Wilson (1962) reports 
temporary remission of pre- disaster psychosomatic and other mental 
health symptomatology during and shortly aft er a disaster . He also 
mentions s ub jective reports of "morale boosts" for some peop l e due to 
a posited " optimal level of stress". There are , however, notable and 
tragic e xamples of serious, widespread psychopathology in the wake of 
ove rwhelmingly catastrophic disasters such as the Buffalo Creek flood 
(Erikson, 1976; Lifton & Olson, 1976; Tierney , et a1., 1979; 
Titchener & Kapp, 1976). This would seem to be supported by the 
inclusion in the DSM III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders , Third Edition) of a new psychiatric classification fo r 
1IPost- traumatic St ress Disorder" (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980). 
Need to Study Psythological 
Aftermath of Disaster 
Tierney, et al . , (1979) summarize their obse r vations by suggest -
ing that the psychological aftermath of disaster has yet to be systema-
tically studied. The nature , types, and intensity of disaster-related 
psychological problems is seen by them as a research area requiring a 
g r eat deal more intensive investigation - not only to broaden our 
understanding of disaster behavio rs, but to develop practical methods 
of coping with them as well. A glance at titles in a recent "DRC 
Publications List 1l (Disaster Research Ce nter, Feb ., 1981) illustrates 
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rather graphically the lack of studies dealing with the psychological 
consequences of disaster. Of 233 available books, monographs, r epo rts, 
articles, preliminary papers, and dissertations, only two titles indi -
cate a primary concern with psychological consequences ( although 
several others suggest that they may deal with this issue in a limited 
way) . 
Stress- Effects Secondary 
to Disaster 
While the argument on the incidence of post-disaster psycho-
pathology has yet to be conclusively and convincingly settled, few 
wo uld question that victim populations undergo substantial stress. As 
early as 1962, Wilson, concluding that comparatively little was known 
about the long- term mental health consequences of disaster , explicitly 
emphasized the need to study stress reactions rather than focus exclu-
sively on mental illness . Numerous studies since then have dealt with 
this aspect of psychologi cal adjustment (Bates, 1963; Bell, 1978; 
Birnbaum, et ai., 1973; Brownstone, 19 77; Cohen, 19 73; Cranshaw, 1963; 
Grossman, 1973; Hall & Landreth, 1975; Houts, Miller, Tokuhata, & 
Ham, 1980; Howard & Go rdon, 1972; Kirn, 1975; Kliman, 1975; 
Mellick, 1978; Raphael, 197 7 ; Schulberg, 1974; and Tuckman, 1973). By 
shifting their attention from psychopathology to stress reactions, re-
searchers have opened up a new and more immediately useful field of study 
with practical applications for direct psychological intrevention (see 
Taylor, et al., 1976). 
Studies (not limited to disasters) in stress reactions and the 
possible consequences of stress (Abram, 1970; Cherniss, 1980; Figley, 
1978; Freedman , Kaplan, & Sadock, 1975; Gregory & Smeltzer , 1977; 
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Kutash & Schlesinger, 1980; Leukel, 1972; Selye, 1974, 1976a, 1976b; 
and Wittkower & Warnes, 1977) suggest multiple possible effects/ 
consequences of prolonged or repeated stress : Anxiety, tension , 
depression, psychosomatic illnesses, suicide ideation and/or attempts, 
marital/family discord, divorce, increased consumption of and/or 
dependence on; alcohol, prescription drugs, non- prescription drugs, 
illegal drugs, increased susceptibility to illness, aggression/ 
violence, domestic Violence, and general adjustment problems. 
While research indicates unequivocally that disaster may provoke 
extreme environmental stress for victims (Tierney , et al ., 1979), cer -
tain questions must be raised about the effects of this stress . Does 
it cause long- term symptoms of psychological disorder in otherwise 
normal individuals? Are the symptoms of stress as transient as the 
environmental stressor which pr oduces them? Do the symptoms of dis -
turbance disappear as soon as the extreme situation alters? tvhat are 
the factors (cu ltural, environmental, social, inter- personal, intra-
psychic, etc . ) that affect the intensity and duration of stress - related 
problems? These and other questions have yet to be adequately answered 
by researchers. 
Purpose of the Pr esent Study 
The intent of the present st udy is to address some of these 
issues . A disaster , the stressor, is seen as the independent va r iable. 
The dependent variable being assessed is the multi - faceted reaction to 
that stressor. If an individual is experiencing tension, anxiety, 
helplessness , or depression because of stress, it will usually be 
manifested in his behavior (Kutash & Schlesinger, 1980 ) . flulti ple 
12 
effects or consequences of stress have been enumerat ed in previous 
research . Many of these behaviora l manifes tations of stress can be 
measu r ed objective l y . To give an accurate understanding, however, of 
the possible impact of a disaster, there needs to be a measure of 
multiple stress effects rather than limiting it to one single effect . 
For instance, there could be an increase in the incidence of child 
abuse cases after a disaster . But if that is the only variable 
measured , it would mak e a poor case for demonstrating a causal rela -
tionship between the stress reaction (chi l d abuse) and the stressor 
(disaster). If, however, there is an increase (compar i ng the post -
disaster data to pre- disaster data) in child abuse, mental health 
case loads , psychosomatic illnesses treated, police calls, divorce 
rates, OWl ' s (Drinking While Intoxicated) issued , welfare caseloads, 
employee sick leave us ed , prescription drug usage, alcohol sales, etc . j 
this makes a much stronger case for demonstrating causation. There -
fore, multiple indicators of stress reactions to disaster were used in 
the presen t investigation . 
Summa r y 
The literature defines disaster as an event : Affecting a com-
munity of persons; confronting that commun ity with actual or perc eive d 
loss or danger; resulting in death, injury, destruction, significant 
losses, and major disruption, and as impacting a large proportion of 
the commun ity ' s population . Disaste r is defined less by the amount of 
dest ruction than in terms of the disruption of human activities and by 
huma n response . The perception of threat or loss, as well as actual 
threat or loss, affects disaster victims. The study of the 
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sociological effects of disaster has been fairly recent, most research 
having occu rre d in the last 25 years. Relatively little is known about 
the psychological effects . Folk wisdom suggested, and still assumes, 
widespread mental illness in the wake of disaster. Early research on 
the psychological affects was limited and tended to focus on patho-
logical symptomatology , with a " disaster syndrome tt being hypothesized 
by some researchers . Later empirica l research consistently failed to 
support these ear l y observations except i n isolated cases of catastro-
phic , over - whelming disaster . Evidence does suggest the pr esence of 
transient "emotional disturbance" . Much recent research has focused 
on the stress cau sed by disaster, a nd the possible psychological con-
seque nc es of the stress. Much more research is needed, however, to 
determine the exten t , intensity, a nd duration of stress-induced psycho-
logical eEEects . 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESIS AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
The purpose of the present study was to collect and assess objec-
tive data to make inferences about the re l ation ship between stress and 
induced symptoms/problems. It was assumed that disaster- related 
symptoms/problems do exist, that they persist beyond a few days o r 
weeks following disaster impact, and that the relationship between the 
disaster (the independent variable) and the stress reaction (the 
dependent variable) is causal . Further it is assumed that a stress 
reaction may be manifested through a broad range of behaviors/symptoms! 
prob l ems. This study was an attempt to test those assumptions . 
The formal hypothesis is as follows : There will be an increase in 
the incidence of non- transient, stress-related symptoms/problems foL -
lowing a disaster, as measured by mu LtipLe objective indices . This 
hypothesis is built around the following o perati o n al def inition s: 
L " Non- transient It shaLL be defined as those changes occurring 
during the post-disaster period between June 1, 1980 and December 
3L, 1980, wh i ch meet the following criterion : The mean for the 
post - disaste r period shows a significan t difference f r om the mean 
of the baseline period (May I, 1979 - April 30 , 1980) . (For the 
rationale fo r the time - frame chose n, see p . 20). 
2. "Stress - related symptoms/problems ll : Anxiety , tension, depres -
sian, psychosoma t ic illness , suicide ideation or attempts, 
marital/family discord, divorce, increased susceptibility to 
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illness, aggression/violence, adjustment problems, consumption of 
and / or dependence onj alcohol, prescription drugs, non-
prescription drugs, or illegal drugs . 
3. "Disaster": The volcanic ashfall on Othello and Adams County 
caused by the eruption of Ht. Saint HeLens on Hay L8, L980. 
4 . "Objective indices": Quantitative data o n the frequency of 
occur r ence of specific behaviors, problems, or incidents (see 
chart on p. 25) . The data wiLL be extracted f r om the records of 
bo th public and private organizations and agencies as delineated 
hereafter . 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Methodological problems of disaster research . Killian ( 1956) has 
detailed the numerous methodological problems, f rustrati ons , and 
cha ll enges inheren t in disaster research. These include such things as 
weak research designs (often developed in considerable haste to study a 
phenomeno n that cannot be scheduled at the convenience of the 
researcher); the lack of controls ; the lack of trustworthy pre-disaster 
data; the difficulty in selecting subjects (and the chall e nge of 
locating them in the wake of destructive disasters such as floods, 
earthquakes , hurricanes, e t c . ) ; the problem of get ting random, reason-
ably representative samples of the subjec t population; and securing the 
cooperation of subjects who may be suspicious of one 1 s motives, dis -
traught with loss, or overwhelmed with the work of recovery . Some of 
these problems have been alleviated, to an exten t, by the existence of 
l1 disaster teams 11 prepared with a variety of r esearch designs and ready 
to t r avel to the scene of seve ral types of disasters . For an i ndivi -
dua l r ese archer, hmvever, Killian 1 s discussion of methodological prob-
lems is highly relevant and merits thorough study. 
The lack of pre- and post - stud i es . The bulk of disaster studies 
up to 1969, according to Barton ( 1969), consisted largely of highly 
descriptive field studies. Most of these a r e comprised of interviews 
and / or questionnaires recording subjective reactions, impressions, 
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recollections, feelings, etc. These are collected anywhere from a few 
hours to many months after the eVent . Wilson (1962), after discussing 
r esearch on the mental health consequences of disaster, points out the 
lack of (and need for) longitudinal studies with pre- and post-disaster 
levels of functio ning. The difficu lt y of this is obviousj disasters 
(the independent variable) are unpredictable and cannot be controlled. 
The existence of pre - disaster data that is reliable, accessible, com-
patible with the research design, and that survives the disaster, is 
understandably rare . Tierney, et a1 . , (1979) , nearly two decades 
lat e r, express a similar concern. 
Subjective versus objective data . There exists another dearth in 
the research literature . As noted before (Barton, 1969), the bulk of 
studies r ely on subjective data collected via interviews or question-
naires. Tierney , et al., (1979) stress that thei r confidence in their 
own (and, by logical extension, others ' ) research findings would be 
greater if the subjective accounts were supported by "large quantities 
of community level statistics" (p. 60) . Examples of the types of 
statistics they sought in their study include mental health and social 
service agency case loads , police records, school absenteeism, 
emergency room reports and hospital admissions, divorce rates, unem-
ployment rates, and welfare caseloads. They encountered problems in 
data collection which are quite common if the paucity of such data in 
research literature is any indication. (Indeed only one published 
study [ Hall & Landreth , 1975] was located , in an ex tensive search, 
which relied to any substantial degree, on objective, statistica l data 
rather than on the victim population's subjective accounts . ) There 
are several factors enumerated by Tierney, et ai., (1979) which make 
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it difficult to collect disaster data : 
1. Few communities have inter- agency data collection systems that 
are systemat ic and collect comparable client data. 
2. Bookkeeping practices, terminology, and classification of 
client problems differ from agency to agency . 
3 . Some organizations, especially small, direct - s ervice ones, see 
record keepi ng as a low-priority item (especiall y when tryi ng to 
meet high demands for services, or facing funding cutbacks) . 
4 . Data co llected by an organization is done so for their own 
purpose and may not meet the researcher's needs or fit the 
research design . 
5. Bookkee ping practices often change ove r time, thus confusing 
data f urther. 
6 . The researcher has no co ntrol over the accuracy or reliabi li ty 
of the data . 
7. Researchers may be refused access to existent data . 
8. Data may not exist in any form . 
9 . Data may be lost or destroyed by the disaste r itself . 
The Mt . Saint Helens ' ashfall on Othello seemed to pr esent a 
unique oppo rtun ity to examine objective data on the question of the 
stress effec ts of disast er . The investigato r, who works in a mental 
health agency, had been a r eside nt of Othello for three years . The 
combination of intimate knowledge of local agencies and resources, 
estab l ished professional relationships, and informal small - town rela -
tionships gave the author access to data that might not have been 
readil y available to an "outsider". 
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Demographic Context of the St udy 
Othello is a town of approximately 4,500 to 5,000 people. The 
population is roughly 74 percent Caucasian, 25 percent Mexican-
Ame r ican , and less than one percent all other races combined. There is 
some seasonal flux in the population due to the migrant labor force, 
but th is has been less in the past two years due to the closing of the 
sugar beet industry. Othello is relatively isolated, the nearest towns 
of any size being Moses Lake, 24 miles north - population 12,982; and 
Trl - Cities (comprised of Pasco, Kennewick, and Richland), 48 miles 
south - population 59,231 (B ureau of the Census , June, 1971). The 
nearest City is Spokane, approximately 100 miles away. The nearest 
interstate highways are 25 to 30 miles away. Local economy is wholly 
agricultural, the only "industry" being two potato processing plants 
and other agricultGre- related services. There is one hospital, two 
outpatient clinics, and two private physicians. There is one nursing 
home. There is one high school , one junior high, and three elementary 
schools. The local mental health clinic (as of May, 1981) consisted of 
three and a half professional and four para-profeSSional positions. 
The mental health center provides 24 hour crisis intervention as well 
as regular clinical services. There are local branch offices of Job 
Servi ce, public welfare, and a senior citizen's advocacy/service group . 
Juveni le court se r vices are handled by two people . The alcohol 
resource and information center for the county is staffed by only one 
person. Child protective services are provided by a stat e agency in 
Moses Lake . There are no other social service agencies, public or 
pr ivate, in Othello . 
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Othello is the catchment area for several smaller communities and 
a number of scattered farm families. These people come from as far as 
25 miles for goods and services. It should be recognized that the data 
collected reflects this broader catchment area rather than Othello 
proper. Where it was possible, however, data obviously not pertinent 
has been screened out [i.e. j if county agencies differentiated between 
services provided in Othello, as opposed to those provided in Ritz-
ville (the county seat , 50 miles east), the latter were e xc luded ]. 
Procedure 
Rationale. In the literature review a number of possible symptoms 
of stress or problems caused by it, were enumerated. Most disaster 
studies have attempted to assess these effects using subjective client 
data . The proposed study will not use subjective data at all, but will 
rely exclusively on objective, statistically based information. The 
assumption being made is that stress-related problems will show up in 
the behavior of victim populations . This study will not deal with 
individuals, but with the whole population in the Othell o catchment 
area. A diag ramatic represe ntat ion in Figure 1 outlines the proposed 
relation between disaster and behavioral consequences. Table 1 e nu-
merates the behavior consequences and the objective indices referred 
to in Figure 1 . 
Rationale for baseline time- frame. Da ta were sought first for the 
time period between May 1, 1979 and April 30, 1980. This was necessary 
to establish a baseline for the incidence of each behavior/problem/ 
symptom . Where data were available, the entire one year ?eriod was 
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used as the ba s e line . Except ions to this a re de tailed in the appendix 
section specific to each agency from wh i c h data were col l ected . 
(I ndependent variable ) 
I Stress Reaction (Dependent variable ) 
Psycho- emotio nal a spects Physiological aspec t s 
=~:;!:~~ion -~ r-~ ~~~~~~i: r a~7~:~~" reaction) 
- anger / -psychosomat~c reactions 
- he lpl e ssness_ - dep letion and possible 
exhaustion of physical 
. _ energy and resources 
Behaviors and/o r Objective Indices of 
Co nsequences -------- "Behaviors and/or ~ Consequences" (Direct 
and Indirect) 
Figure 1. A proposed disaster - outcome model. 
The one year baseline allowed for se veral things: 
1. It gave a good sample of pre-disaster behavior levels for 
comparative purposes . 
2. It gave a month - by - mo n th (June 1979 , Ju ne 1980; J ul y 1979 , 
July 1980) compar ison to control for possible seasonal variations 
in behavior . 
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Table 1 
Objective I ndices of Behaviors 
Behaviors/Co ns equences 
Increased susceptibility 
to illness and a greater 
freque ncy of psychoso-
matic illnesses and 
illnesses aggravated by 
stress 
Marital and family 
problems 
Alcohol abuse 
Drug abuse 
Agg ression and 
violence 
Adjus tment problems 
and/or Consequences 
Objective Indices 
Total patient contacts at medical clinic , 
hospital emergency room visits, psychosoma-
tic problems diagnosed, employee sick l eave 
and vacation time used, average patient 
census at hospital, number of patients hos-
pitalized , death rate, school absenteeism, 
welfare caseloads , drug prescriptions 
filled, diagnoses of illnesses aggravated 
by stress 
Divorces filed, child abuse investigations , 
mental health caseloads , police calls for 
domestic violence, juvenile court refer-
rals, school absenteeism, foster home 
placements 
Clients served in community alcohol pro-
gram, alcohol sales, OWl's issued (Driving 
While Intoxicated), other alcohol related 
tickets or arrests, rate of auto aCCidents, 
referrals to Alcohol Information School, 
police I!breathalyzer t' tests for intoxica-
tion 
Drug related arrests, drug prescriptions 
filled , dr ug r elated police calls, suicide 
attempts by drug overdose 
Police ca lls, criminal ttbookings", criminal 
cases opened in superior court, child abuse 
invest igations, school discipline reports 
Men tal health caseloads, welfare caseloads, 
police calls, psychiatric commitment i nves -
tigations, s uicide attempts, district and 
superior court case loads , school dropout 
rate, jail census, mental illness diag-
noses, juvenile court referrals 
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J . It allowed for the emergence of any trends that were develop-
ing before the disaster and hopefully thereby eliminated any 
unwarranted conclusions about It caus al" relationships that actually 
antedate the disaster. 
4. It seemed to lend itself to demonstrating gen u ine causal 
relationships, should the y exist. 
Rationale for post - disaster time frame . The post - disaster time 
frame f r om June 1, 1980 to December 31, 1980 was selected fo r several 
reasons : 
1. Tierney, et ai., (1979) define the rlpost - disast er period" as 
beginning approximately two weeks after the disaster event. 
2. Exclusion of the thirteen day period between disaster impact 
on May 18 , 1980 and June 1, 1980 decreased the possibility of 
skewi ng or distortion of data due to the "transient" symptoms of 
emotiona l disturbance ( Taylor, et ai., 1976; Tierney, et at., 
1979). 
J . Much of the data to be sought appeared in monthl y r eports or 
summaries . Thus it was also hoped that the selected time frame 
wo uld facilitate data collecti on. 
4. The investigator deemed it impo r tant to include the end of 
year hol i day seaso n i n the time frame . 
5. It was ass umed that ending the data co l lection seven and a 
half months after the disaster impact would allow ampl e time to 
at least tentatively ass e ss the hypothesized non- trans ien t 
disaster- r elated effects withou t undue distortion from poss ible 
interveni ng variables that cou l d have induced substantial 
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widespread stress (i.e.; high interest rates, inflation 
recession, state/national political climate, etc.). 
As in the pre-disaster time frame, data available on at least a 
monthly basis were sought for the full seven months of the post-
disaster period. The month of May, 1980, which includes the period 
of impact, was excluded from both the pre- and post - disaster periods 
for reasons previously stated. Any exceptions are noted in the 
appendix specific to each agency . 
Target agencies for data collection. Permission was sought to 
obtain access to the records of those agencies and individuals who, 
in the course of their professional duties, dealt with the behaviors, 
problems, or incidents, that had been identified in the stress 
literature as being symptomatic of, or resulting from, stress . These 
agencies, and the types of problem areas explored in each are included 
in Table 2. 
Table 
Target Agencies and Data Collected 
Target Agencies 
Adams County Counseling 
Service 
Superior Court for 
Adams County 
Data Collected 
Number of crisis calls (including 
suicide attemp t s) 
Number of commitment investigations 
Number of appointments scheduled, 
including those not kept. 
Number of criminal cases filed 
Number of non - criminal cases filed 
(excluding divorces) 
Divorces filed 
Target Agencies 
Adams County Auditor 
Adams County Alcohol 
Department 
Carnation Company 
Department of Social and 
Health Services 
(State of Washington) 
Othello Community 
Hospital 
Adams County Juvenile 
Court 
Columbia Basin Health 
Association 
Othello Outlook (a 
local newspaper) 
Police Department 
Community Schools 
Table 2 
(Continued) 
Data Collected 
Marriage licenses issued 
Total number of client referrals 
Employee sick leave/vacation 
Child abuse investigations 
'\.Jelfare assistance grants 
Emergency room contacts 
New admis sians 
Percent of occupancy 
Staff sick leave/vacation 
Total client referrals 
Total patient contacts 
Diagnoses of: 
mental illness 
illnesses aggravated by stress or 
emotional illness 
Staff sick leave/vacation 
Auto accidents 
Deaths 
District court statistics 
Number of incidents (by type) 
Jail census 
Total Police calls (Form l's) 
Attendance 
Discipline problems (formal reports 
filed) 
Staff sick leave/vacation 
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Statistical Procedures 
The investigat or had originally intended to use a t - test for the 
significance of the di ffe r ence between the means of the baseline 
period and the post-di s aster period . The i nvestigator ' s thesis 
commi ttee, however, suggested that for an exploratory study of 
this type , a simple graphed compar ison of the pre - and post-data 
would be more appropriate. As it turned Qut , even trying to graph 
the data proved to be no easy task. Tierney , et al., (1979) did not 
overstate the difficulty of collecting suitable statistics from a 
var iety of agencie s. Even s t atis t ics gleaned within a single agency 
sometimes proved frustratingly slippe r y ove r the seemingly short 20 
month int erval under scrutiny. The f ir st sec tion of each g raph s hows 
the baseline data. Immediately adjacent is a graph of the post-
disaster data . 
The di fference be t ween the pre- and post - data will also be 
figured as a percentage. The autho r recognizes that this can lead to 
erroneous conc lusio ns if not examined in context. Criteria for 
determi n ing s i gnificance are explained o n page 27. 
Finally a chi square test was used on several cQmbina~ions of 
data to give very simple indicators of the amount of overall change 
which occurred. This is detailed in the "Results" section. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
A Simple Criterion for Determining Significance 
Due to the sheer volume of raw data collected, and in the 
interes t of readability, the raw data are presented in appendices 
rather than in the text. Included in each appendix is a table of 
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the data, a graph of the pre- and post -d isaster data, and a brief 
explanator y section detailing methodology, scope of catchment area, 
and comment s helpful in understanding the data. The investigator 
deems such information essential both in comprehending the data 
fully, and in fut ure attempts to replicate the study, should such 
occur. All data collected from any agency are pr esented together to 
minimize redundancy in the explanatory sections. The inter ested 
reader will find these appendices somewhat difficult to wade through, 
but valuable as an aid to interpreting the data . 
As noted previously, the investigator did not use statistical 
tests of significance on these data. It seemed appropriate, however, 
to make some attemp t at defining which changes in the post - disaster 
data were significant ones, and which were not. In the absence of 
standardized guidelines, and with no unarguable line of demarcation 
being evident in the data, the investigator selected 10% change as 
a minimum level of significance. Any change of 10% or more is, for 
the purpose of this study, deemed a signi ficant one . Any change of 
less than 10% is deemed nonsignificant. 
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The objection can be raised that some of the data show changes 
that are (by this criterion) significant, but which rely on very 
small numbers of incidents, behaviors, or problems. One might 
suggest that changes in such data are simply due to chance. This 
investigator sees no way to adequately refute this objection, and 
must simply acknowledge it. One must consider t however, that 
where the numbers (both pre- and post-disaster) are small, there a r e 
at least two possibilities: the change ~ be due to chance, or it 
~ reflect a significant disaster- related change in the occurrence 
of relatively rare events. The reader will have to decide, in some 
instances, which in t erpretation to accept . 
Assumptions Abo ut the Meaning of Change/No Change 
Using the criterion of significance defined above, one of three 
things is true for each behavior/consequence : there is a significant 
i ncrease, there is a significant decrease, or there is no significant 
change . The existence of transient psychoemotional problems is well 
established and accepted (Tierney et al . , 1979) . Therefore, the 
present study attempted to access the natur e and extent of hypothesized 
nontransient psycho- emotional effects of disaster; i.e., those that 
showed signi fican t change through the en t ire pos t-d i saster pe r iod. 
Increases . Those indices which showed increase s in the 
behavior s/consequences under study are seen as supporting the 
hypothesis. The disaster acted as a stressor , and the anticipated 
effects were "measured " in those objectiv e indices shewing increases. 
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Decreases. The data showing decreases were thought initially 
to be not supportive of the hypothesis. The changes go in the 
opposite direction suggested by the hypothesis, and they meet the 
criterion established for "significant" change . The investigator ' s 
thesis committee, however, suggested an alternate and intriguing 
way of conceptualizing these data. Assuming that the disaster does 
act as a stressor, and that people are affected by it, not all of 
their individual or collective responses will necessarily be 
maladapt i ve . The focus of the present study is on the type of 
problems possibly caused by a disaster. But as early as 1962 Wilson 
(1962), was discussing the positive effects of disaster as indicated 
by research. Those indices in the present s tudy showing decreases 
could be seen as reflecting positive and appropriate adaptations to 
s tress. Such "adaptive responses," while not directly supporting 
the hypothesis, may in a sense provide indirect support, to the degree 
one can accept this conceptualization as valid for any gi ven index. 
In the absence of an empirically verified interpretation, it certainly 
seems reasonable to try and account for significant decreases as 
adaptive responses to stress which may prove to be non-transient 
"benefits" ra ther than problems. 
No Change . Where there is no significant change in either 
direction, one is left with several alternatives. It may be that 
the stressor did not affect people substantially in the area being 
assessed . Or, it may have had a significant effect (with either 
po tential increases or potential decreases) that was mitigated by 
30 
intervening variables not as yet identified. Or, it may be that the 
index used to assess the impact was not sufficiently sensitive to 
give an accurate assessment. Or, finally, there may be problems 
wi th validity; some of the indices may be inappropriate as measur es 
o f a particular behavior/consequence . 
Indices Showing Increases/Decreases 
and No Chan ge 
Of the 34 indices measured , a total of 20 showed significant 
increases. These are listed in Table 3 , in order from the least to 
the greatest change. Five indices showed significant decreases . 
These are lis t ed in Table 4, in o rder from the least to the greatest 
change . Nine of the 34 indices assessed failed to meet the criterion 
for significance. These are listed in Tab l e 5, in or de r from the 
greatest decrease to t he gr eatest increase. 
Chi Square Test of Significance 
The chi squar e test of significance was applied to several 
contingency tables t o assess the amount of change. Because the 
frequencies are rather small, and also because there is only one 
degree of freedom , the Yates correc tion for cont inuity is applied 
as follows: 
x2 
CIO-EI - . 5)2 
E 
The null hypo thesis is used in each case; i . e., it is assumed that 
the distribution observed does not differ from what would be expected 
by chance alone . 
Table 3 
Indices Showing Significant Increases 
Averages 
Indices Pre- Post -
District Court Cases Involving 
Alcohol--Excluding DWI's 
(Driving While Intoxicated) 9.0 9.9 
Police Form l 's for "Disorderly 
Conduct" 
Tot al Police Form I's 
District Court: Total Cases 
Adj udicated 
Deat h Rate (Number of Obituaries) 
Referrals to Community Alcohol 
Center 
Hospi tal Emergency Room Visits 
Mental Health Appoint ments 
Scheduled 
Adult Criminal "Bookings" 
Police Form I I S for "Vandalism/ 
Malicious Mischief ll 
Employee Sick Leave/Vacation Time 
Used at Columbia Basin Health 
16.9 
304 . 8 
218.4 
4 .3 
46 . 6 
317.3 
103.7 
28.3 
11. 4 
Association 402.4 
Police Form I ' s for "Assault" 2.6 
Psychiatric Commitment Investigations 8.0 
Employee Sick Leave/Vacation Time 
Used at Othello Community 
Hospital 
Police Form I IS for "Liquor Laws" 
691. 9 
4.8 
18.6 
346.1 
248.0 
5.1 
55.9 
384.0 
126.4 
34.7 
14.1 
504.9 
3 . 3 
10 . 7 
953.6 
6 . 9 
31 
Percent 
Change 
10.0% 
10 . 0% 
13.5% 
13.6% 
18.6% 
20 . 0% 
21.0% 
21. 9% 
22.7% 
23.7% 
25 . 5% 
27.0% 
33 . 8% 
37.8% 
43 . 6% 
Indices 
Police Form l 's for "Domestic 
Violence" 
Calls on Mental Health Crisis 
LIne 
Diagnoses of Stress-Aggravated 
Illnesses 
Psychosomatic Diagnoses 
Mental Illness Diagnoses 
Table 3 
(Continued) 
Averages 
Pre- Post -
7.3 10.6 
13.0 23.3 
44.6 133.0 
31. 3 99.8 
14.8 49 .7 
Table 4 
Indices Showing Significant Decreases 
Averages 
Indices Pre- Post-
Juvenile Court Referrals 25 . 3 22.6 
Police "Breathalyzer" tests 
for Intoxication 12.3 10.7 
Rate of Automobile Accidents 6.2 4.9 
Police Form I IS for "DWI IS" 6.3 4.9 
Criminal Cases Filed in Superior 
Court 4.8 3. 0 
32 
Percent 
Change 
45.2% 
79.2% 
198.2% 
218.8% 
235.8% 
Percent 
Change 
10.7% 
13.0% 
21. 0% 
22.0% 
37 .5 % 
Table 5 
Indices Showing No Significant Change 
I ndices 
Child Abuse Investigation 
Patients Admitted to Hospital 
Divorces Filed 
District Cour t DWr's 
Superior Court Noncriminal cases 
Filed 
~.Jelfare Assistance Grants 
Percent Daily Occupancy at Hospital 
J uvenile Criminal "Bookings " 
Absenteeism at Carnation Co. 
(% of work force) 
Averages 
Pre- Post-
28.1 25.6 
145 . 4 134 . 9 
6 . 3 5.9 
9.3 9.0 
20 . 7 20 . 4 
297.3 296 . 4 
32.6 32.6 
8.1 8.3 
3.9 4 . 0 
Percent 
Change 
8.9% 
7.2% 
6.3% 
3.2% 
1.4% 
0.3% 
0.0% 
2 .4% 
2.6% 
The fi rst contingency table addresses the difference between 
"increases" and linD change," and is significant at the .05 level. 
The null hypo thesis is, in this instance, rejected. Therefore 
overall more change occurred following the disaster period than 
expected by chance (Table 6). 
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Table 6 
Differences Between "Increase s" and "No Change" 
0 E (0-E-. 5) (0- E-. 5)2 (O-E- . 5) 2/E 
Increase 20 14.5 5 25 1.72 
No Change 9 14.5 -6 36 2.48 
L 4.20 =X2 
The second contingency table addresses "decreases " versus IIno 
change," and is not significant at the . 05 level. The null hypothesis 
is accepted in this case . One must conclude, therefore, that the total 
number of decreases are not significantly more frequent than no change 
at all (Table 7). 
Table 7 
Differences Between "Decreases" and "No Change" 
a E (0-E-.5) (0-E-.5)2 (0-E- . 5)2/E 
Decrease 5 -2.5 6.25 .89 
No Change 9 1.5 2.25 .32 
L 1.21 = X2 
The third contingency table addresses the different between 
"increases" and "decrease," and is significant at the .01 level. 
The null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, more stress related change 
than adaptation was observed. 
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Table 8 
Differences Between "Increases 11 and "Decreases" 
0 E (O-E-.5) (O-E-.5 ) 2 (O- E-. 5)2/E 
Increases 20 12.5 7 49 3.92 
Decreases 5 12. 5 -8 64 5.12 
l: = 9.04 X2 
The final contingency table addresses the difference between 
all types of "change" (both increases and decreases) and "no 
change," it is s ignificant at the .01 level and once again, the 
null hypothesis is rejec t ed . More change than stability was observed 
during the post-disaster period (Table 9) . 
Table 
Difference Be.tween All Types of "Change" and "No Change" 
0 E (O-E-.5) (O- E- .5)2 (O- E- . 5)2/E 
Change 25 17 7.5 56.25 3.31 
No Change 9 17 8.5 72 . 25 4.25 
l: 7.56 = X2 
Indices Relating to Specific Problem Areas 
There were eight indices iden t ified as being related to illness. 
Welfare assistance grants (of which roughly half were for medical 
ass istance ) showed no significant change. The number of patients 
admitted to the hospital declined slightly, but i t is worth noting 
that the percent of daily occupancy at the hospital was virtually 
unchanged in the pre- and post-disaster periods . This suggests 
that the average length o f stay was somewhat l onger after the 
ashfall. 
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Employee sick l eave and vacation time used showed an interesting 
pattern. Carnation Company showed only a 2.6 percent increase; 
and the community schools (in some data on 134 employees not 
otherwise used in the study) showed only a three percent increase 
in the use of substitutes. On the other hand, however, employees at 
the medical clinic used 25.5 percent more vacation and sick leave, 
while the hospital staff increased their time off by 37.8%. The 
rather substantial difference between the two groups could be 
attributed to the fact that the school employees and the Carnation 
Company employees both had relatively large blocks of time off during 
the post-disaster period. (School teachers had vacation from mid-May 
to early September, plus a week long Christmas vacation. Carnation 
Company Employees were off in seasonal shut - downs from mid - J uly 
through mid-August, and the whole month of De~ember.) This ~ hav .. 
had the effect of reducing their personal stress and allowing them 
time to adjust more effectively. It could, however, be just i fiably 
argued that including such "undesirable ll vacation months as January 
and February skews the pre-disaster data. Comparing data from June to 
December of each year shows only a 3 . 5% increase for medical clinic 
staff, although there was still a 23.3% increase fo r hospital staff. 
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The remaining indices seem to support the hypothesis. Death 
rates , as measured by obituaries, increased by 18 . 6%. Hospital 
emergency room visits took a 21% jump. Total monthly patient 
encounters a t the medical clinic declined by 1.7% (pre - disaster 
average, 28J4 ; post - disaster average , 2785); but showed substantial 
increases in the specific groups of illnesses under study. Stress-
aggravated illnesses increased by 198.2%; psychosomatic illnesses 
by 218.8%; and diagnoses of mental illness by 235.8%. The investi-
gator was initially suspicious of these figures , but a cross-check 
by the clinic manager verified their accuracy. In the six- month post -
disaster period for which data were available , the total number of 
diagnoses in the three categories was 1,695. Even allowing fo r 
multiple diagnoses on the same individual, that represents a lar ge 
group of people in Othello who may have been adversely affected by 
the ashfall , particularly since this cross section does not include 
patients going to pr i vate or out - af- town phYSicians, or to the other 
medical clinic in Othello. Thus, the indices which are most directly 
related to illness seem to support the hypothesis (see Table 10). 
There are six indices of "Mari tal and Fa..i1ily Prob lems. " The 
number of divorces filed showed a 6.3% decline. Child abuse 
investigations decreased by 8.9%, and Juvenile Court referrals declined 
by 10.7% . (The lat ter figure re flects a three- year tre~d in decreas -
ing numbers of loca l juvenile cour t referrals : 573 in 1978, 324 
in 1979 , and 284 in 1980.) These indices do not support the 
hypothesis . 
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The other three indices, however, do seem to support it. Mental 
health appointments, of which a large (but undetermined) number were 
for marriage or family counseling, increased by 21 . 9%. Crisis calls, 
which again reflected large numbers of family problems, increased 
by 79.2%. Police calls for "domes tic violence" showed a 45.2% 
increase (see Table 11). 
There were seven indices identified as being related to alcohol 
abuse. It should be noted that none of the indices are concerned with 
alcohol consumption per se, but with pr oblems arising from drinking. 
Ther e were decreases in several areas. Breathalyzer tests for 
intoxication decreased 13 %. The number of auto accidents also 
declined, by an average of 22%. This however, was not necessarily 
because more drivers were sober. The ash represented such a constant 
driving hazard, especially when the wind blew, that drivers were , by 
necessity , driving both slower and more cautiously. (The investigator 
recognizes that this is an empirically unverified assumption. But 
he personally drove many miles through said blowing ash, and contends 
that direct experience gives at least face validity to that 
assumption . ) This would seem to represent an instance of an 
adaptive reaction to the stress . It may, however, be one that is 
unique to this particular disaster. 
The Police Form l ' s for "DWI ' s" (Driving While Intoxicated) 
declined by 22%. This however, represents only the City Police 
Department. The DWI's seen in District Court declined by only 3. 2% . 
This number represents the sum of the city citations and those 
issued out side city limits (b ut s till in the Othello area). This 
is probably a mo r e accurate measure of the number of DWI's. 
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District Court cases involving alcohol (excluding DWl 's) 
increased by 10% . The number of police Form l ' 5 for "liquor laws " 
increased by 43.6%. Pr obably the most valid ind i cator of alcohol 
problems , however, was the number of people referr ed t o the 
Communi t y Alcohol Center. Dat a on a t otal of 950 referrals indicate 
a 20% increase in the post - disas ter period. These data s uppor t the 
hypothesis (Table 12). 
There are 9 indices identified in connection with "Aggression 
and Vi olence ." Child abuse inves t igations decreased by 8.9%. The 
other index s howing a decrease was the 37.5% decline in criminal 
cases filed i n Superior Court. This represents the largest change 
in any of the indices showing decreases . This may be ano t her 
inst ance of an tladaptive response " to the stress. One could 
speculate (and t his is recognized as hi ghly speculative) that people 
were busy coping wi th more immediate problems, and ther e was less 
need , time, or inclination t o e n gage in serious criminal behavior s . 
One could also speculate that with increased burdens on the district 
court and the police, the legal system reac ted by decreasing 
referrals into the more time-consuming c hannels of the higher court . 
This issue of "adapt ive responses" is one meriting f urthe r study. 
The t otal police For m l 's, representing all police calls of any 
nature, i nc reased by 13.5% . This seems rather substantial when one 
considers that the total number of such official cal l s in the period 
unde r study was Sli ghtly over 6 ,000. Form l's for "Disorderly 
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Conduct.tl increased by 10%; those fo r "Vandalism/Malicious Mischief" 
by 23.7%; those for "Assault" by 27%, and Form 1 IS for "Domestic 
Violence" increased by 45.2%. Adult criminal "bookings II went up 
22 . 7% . These data combine to provide support for the hypothesis 
(Table 13). 
The final indices, those relating to IIAdjustment Problems" 
(Table 14), represent the area least susceptible to precise 
definition, but possibly most significant in a psycho-social study 
of stress. Defining "adjustment" is a problem that has plagued 
psychologists since the inception of psychology as a discipline. It 
is one still troubling to theorists and practitioners alike (Sawry 
& Telford , 1967). It might be suggested with some validity that 
this entire study deals with the issue of adjustment. In that light, 
those 12 indices could well be viewed as a summary. 
Welfare Assistance grants showed virtually no change in the 
post-disaster period. Superior Court criminal cases decreased by 
37.5%, although noncriminal cases filed in the same court showed 
only a 1.4% decrease. These are the only indices which did not 
support the hypothesis. 
District Court cases adjudicated showed an overall increase 
of l3.6%. Since this involved over 4,300 cases, the increase seems 
to be a substantial one. (It would also seem a potentially more 
sensitive indicator of stress than would the number of cases tried 
in Superior Court. The cases tried in Superior Court are of a 
generally serious nature, while those in District Court reflect less 
critical, but more immediate problems.) Total Police Form lis 
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increased by 13.5%, with the number of police calls exceeding 6,000. 
Adult criminal "Bookings" increased by 22 .7%. Referrals to the 
Community Alcohol Center increased by 20% . Hospital Emergency Room 
visits increased by 21%. Hental illness diagnoses at the medical 
clinic showed a 235.8% increase. Hental health clinic figures 
showed a 21.9% increase in the number of appointments scheduled , a 
33.8% increase in the number of psychiatric commitment investigations 
completed, and a 79.2% increase in calls on the crisis line. These 
data all combine to support the hypothesis . 
Tables 10 - 14. which follow , show all the indices relevant to each 
problem area. It will be noted that some of the indices are used in 
two different tables; i.e., "Mental Illness Diagnoses" is used in 
the "Illness" table, and in the table on "Adjustment problems." 
This is done only when the particular index seems to logically apply 
to both areas. There are 10 indices so used, but no single index 
appears in more than two tables. 
Patients admitted t o hospital 
Helfare assistance grants 
Percent daily occupancy at hospital 
Table 10 
Indices of Illness 
Pre-disaster 
Average 
145.4 
297.3 
32.6 
Post-disaster 
Average 
134.9 
296.4 
32.6 
Employee sick leave/vacation time used 
Carnation ab senteeism (% of work 
force) 3. 9 4.0 
Columbia Basin Health Associat i on 402.4 504.9 
Othello Commun ity Ho spItal 691. 9 953.6 
Death rate (number of obituaries) 4 . 3 5.1 
Hospital Emergency Room visi.t s 317.3 384 . 0 
Diagnosis of s tress-aggravated 
illnesses 44 . 6 133.0 
Psychosomatic diagnoses 31. 3 99.8 
Hental illness diagnoses 14.8 49.7 
Percent Change 
Increase/Decrease/No Change 
7.2% decrease 
0.3% decrease 
0.0% no change 
2. 6% increase 
25.5% increase 
37.8% increase 
18.6% increase 
21.0% increase 
198.2% increase 
218.8% increase 
235 . 8% increase p. 
N 
Table n 
Indices of Marital and Family Problems 
Pre-disas t er Post-disaster 
Average Average 
Juvenile court referrals 25.3 22 .6 
Child a buse investigations 28 .1 25 . 6 
Divorces f iled 6.3 5.9 
Mental Health appointments scheduled 103.7 126 .4 
Police calls f or "dome s tic violence 11 7.3 10.6 
Crisis line cal ls l3.0 23.3 
Percent Change 
Increase /Decr e ase /No Change 
10 .7% decrease 
8.9% decrease 
6.3% dec r ease 
21.9% increase 
45 . 2% increase 
79.2% increase 
'" w 
Polic e Form 1 t s for "OW l I g " 
(Driving Hhile Intoxica t ed ) 
Police "Breathalyzer II Test s for 
Intoxication 
Rate of Auto Accidents 
Distric t Court DWl ' s 
(Driv ing \,hile Intoxicated ) 
Dis t ric t Court Cases Involving 
Alcohol (exc luding DHI' s ) 
Referrals to Community Alcohol 
Center 
Po lice Form l' s for IILiquor Laws" 
Table 12 
Indices of Alcohol Abuse 
Pre-disaster 
Ave ra ge 
6.3 
12.3 
6.2 
9.3 
9.0 
46.6 
4.8 
Post-disaster 
Average 
4.9 
10.7 
4.9 
9.0 
9.9 
55.9 
6.9 
Percent Change 
Increase/Decrease/No Change 
22 .0% decrease 
13.0% decrease 
21.0% decrease 
3. 2% decrease 
10.0% increase 
20 . 0% increase 
43.6% increase 
". 
". 
Table 13 
Indices of Aggression and Violence 
Criminal Cases Filed in Superior 
Court 
Child Abuse Investigations 
Juvenile Criminal "Bookings " 
Adult Criminal II Bookings" 
Police Form l i s for "Disorderly 
Conduct " 
Police Form lis for "Vandalism/ 
Malicious Mischief" 
Police Form l i s for "Assault" 
Police Form l' s for "Domestic 
Violence" 
Total Po l ice Form l ' s 
Pre-disaster 
Average 
4.8 
28.1 
8 . 1 
28.3 
16.9 
11.4 
2.6 
7.3 
304.8 
Post-disaster 
Average 
3.0 
25.6 
8.3 
34.7 
18 . 6 
14.1 
3.3 
10.6 
346.1 
Percent Change 
Increase/Decrease/No Change 
37.5% decrease 
8.9% decrease 
2.4% increase 
22.7% increase 
10 .0% increase 
23 . 7% increase 
27.0% increase 
45.2% increase 
13.5% increase 
"'" ..  
Table 14 
Indices of Adjustment Problems 
Pre-disaster 
Average 
Superior Court Criminal Cases Filed 
Superior Court Noncriminal Cases 
Filed 
Welfare Assistance Grants 
District Court: Total Cases 
Adj udicated 
Total Police Form I's 
Referrals to Community Alcohol 
Cen t er 
Hospital Emergency Room Visits 
Adult Criminal "Bookings" 
Mental Health Case load 
Total Appointments Scheduled 
Psychiatric Commitment Investigations 
Calls on Crisis Line 
Mental Illness Diagnoses at 
Medical Clinic 
4.8 
20.7 
297 .3 
218.4 
304 . 8 
46.6 
317.3 
28.3 
103.7 
8.0 
13.0 
14.8 
Post-disaster 
Average 
3.0 
20.4 
296.4 
248 .0 
346 . 1 
55.9 
384.0 
34.7 
126 . 4 
10.7 
23.3 
49.7 
Percent Change 
Increase/Decrease/No Change 
37.5% decrease 
1.4% decrease 
0.3% decrease 
13.6% increase 
13.5% increase 
20.0% increase 
21.0% increase 
22.7% increase 
21 .9% increase 
33.8% increase 
79. 2% increase 
235.8% increase 
". 
'" 
Introduction 
CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The assumption underlying the hypothesis is that the physical 
and psychological consequences of stress will often manifest 
themselves in behavior. The present investigation is less a study 
of disaster, per se, than it is of the behaviors resulting from 
disaster as a stressor. This is not, and cannot be, a study of 
individual people. One of the frustrating methodological problems 
mentioned by Killian (1956) is the difficulty in securing pre-
disaster data. Unless the investigator is fortunate enough to have 
been engaged in a suitable research project prior to the disaster, 
usable data on individuals are extremely difficult to obtain. The 
focus of the present study was on the stress reactions of a whole 
population. 
Research on stress, previously cited, suggests that some common 
reactions to stress are those enumerated in Table 1. If a majority 
of the posited objective indices of behaviors and/or consequences 
(also listed in Table 1) show significant increases, a strong 
correlation is established and a causal relationship might be 
tentatively assumed, even if not rigorously proven. 
In the present study the effects of stress on five problem 
areas was assessed. Indices of illness showed seven increases, and 
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fo ur with no significant change. Indices of marital and family problems 
showed three increases, one decrease, and two with no significant 
change. Indices of alcohol abuse showed three increases, three 
decreases, and one with no significant change. Indices on aggression 
and v iolence showed six increases, one decrease, and one with no 
significant change. Indices of adjustment problems showed nine 
increases, one decrease, and two with no significant change. The 
data seems to s .uggest that the disaster was indeed a stressor; that 
the effects of the stress affected substantial numbers of people 
in various ways; and that many of the indices identified we re able 
t o provide objective evidence of that stress. 
This study was designed to be wholly insensitive to the 
transient emotional/psychological problems or symptoms identified by 
previous researchers (Tierney, et al., 1979). The investigator 
was concerned with assessing the extent of "nontransient" stress 
effects. The data, by and large, support the existence of multiple, 
nontransient, behavioral manifestations of stress. Such findings 
have a good deal of social significance. Tierney et al ., (1979) 
cite multiple sources in support of the existence or "transient" 
emotional disorder in the first two weeks after a disaster, but 
reject the notion of a "disaster syndrome" (Tyhurst, 1951) based on 
a review of recent research literature. The data from the present 
study seems to fill the void between transient emotional disorders 
and psychopathology. Each index deemed significant had to maintain 
at least a 10% average increase for the e ntire seven month post-
disaster period. One could safely assume that at least some of these 
changes continued beyond the seven month cutoff date for an 
undetermined length of time. 
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It would seem important for people in a disaster-af fected 
community to be aware of these issues . Police, local officials, 
medical personnel, and mental health staff could all play an 
important role in pr eventing possible exacerbation of problems by 
recognizing the on- going nature of the disaster- related s tress and 
helping people learn to deal with it . Tierney et al. (1979) have 
some excellent suggestions for doing this in rural communities, with 
special emphasis on the role of mental health professionals . 
Rival Hypotheses 
One must, however, in the interest of scientific objectivity 
raise the question of rival hypotheses. While it has been 
demonstrated that the population in and around Othello showed the 
effects of significant stress , the stressor could conceivably have 
been somet hing other than the disaster . The most likely possibilities 
were local unemp l oyment rates and economic factors affecting agri-
culture (interest on farm loans, prices received for produce, and 
farming operational costs). Data for Adams County from the local 
Job Service show pre- and post-disas ter unemployment rates of approxi -
mately 8.3% and 8.7% , respectively (the averages are approximate 
because data were unavailable for some months). The data for Adams 
County paralleled similar data for Washington Sta t e, with the state 
showing pre - and post-disaster aver ages of approximately 7.2% and 
7.9%, respectively. This increase seems to be too insignificant 
to account for the results ob t ained in the indices of stress . 
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The economic factors are more difficult to assess. Exceptionally 
good yields were obtained during 1979 and 1980 growing seasons for 
the area's important crops (The Out look, 1979 - 1980) . But interest 
rates on farm loans have risen, and operational costs have been 
increasing steadily over the past several years, with resultant 
pressure on farm families and an impact on the economy of the whole 
area. 
There are two arguments that can be raised against acceptance of 
economic pressures as a primary causal factor. The first is the fact 
that such pressures have always been a part of a farm lifestyle. 
Farm communities have always lived with the vagaries of weather, crop 
yields, prices , disease, pests, expensive supplies, and the whims of 
local and national economy. Those who cannot tolerate these aspects 
of farm living get into a different line of work. It seems unlikely 
that a commonly recognized and accepted part of farm living could 
account for the stresses observed. 
A second argument is the disparity between the gradual increase 
of stress (in this case the stressor is the economic pressures affect-
ing agriculture) and the sudden increase of stress-re lated symptoms/ 
consequences. The stres s (as measured by higher interest rates and 
increased oper ational costs) has been gradually increasing over the 
last several years. The symptoms/consequences however, did not 
increase gradually, they jumped substantially in the post-disaster 
time frame. The "economic" hypothesis cannot account for this; the 
"disaste r" hypothesis not only accounted for it , but predicted the 
o utcome. It seems emminently logical, though, to suggest that the 
combination of economic factors and the disaster resulted in a 
"potentiating" effect which increased the stress on individuals 
and on the community. 
Weakness of the Research Design 
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The single most important flaw in the research design, in the 
opinion of the investigator, is the lack of a control for comparison. 
Ideally, a town (not impacted by the ashfall) of similar size, 
racial composition, income, geographic isolation, and economic base 
(agriculture) should have been selected. Then the same exhaustive 
study of objective indices would be required . After this was completed 
there would be a realistic basis for a discussion of causality. 
For a single investigator however, this would be a nearly over-
whelming task. Even Tierney et al. (1979), with the resources of an 
experienced, university sponsored disaster team, were unable to achieve 
this goal, much as they would have liked to. In addition to this lack, 
the investigator recognizes as well that longer pre- and post-
disaster time frames would have been desirable. It was observed, 
however, that the longer the pre- and post-time frames being studied, 
the more difficult became the collection of data. In addition, as 
previously noted, longer time frames increase the possibility of 
intervening var iables which must be controlled. 
Another concern about the study is not due to the research design 
per se, but illustrates one of the frus trations /challenges of 
disaster research. The investigator sought data from the following 
sources, but could not get it: 
1. Rexall Drug (data on drug prescriptions filled were 
unavailable). 
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2. Potter Drug (data on prescriptions filled were available, 
but the investigator was refused access to the information), 
Data on sales of alcoholic beverages were desired, but would 
have required permission, access to records, and the collecting 
a nd synthesizing of data from seven stores (one of which opened 
during the period under study), 11 taverns or restaurants, and one 
state liquor store. The investigator did not have the resources 
necessary to accomplish such a demanding task. 
The Othello Community Schools were extremely cooperative in 
providing data, but the investigator was unable to use the bulk of 
it. Data tailored to meet the schools' needs for information supply 
could not be adapted, by any sort of creative juggling, to this 
study's time frames and procedures. The investigator regrets this 
unavoidable gap in data. 
A final area of concern is the whole question of validity. Do 
the indices chosen actua l ly measure the behaviors/consequences they 
are identified with in this study? The investigator made every 
effort to choose indices that were either identified by other 
researchers as being related to the behaviors/consequences studied, 
or that seemed logically related. The reader will recognize, however, 
that this is still no guarantee of validity. This issue cannot be 
dismissed or taken lightly; but it cannot, at present, be fully 
resolved. This researcher has attempted to assure at least face 
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validity, but feels compelled to acknowledge the need for further 
research to establish conceptual validity. It is hoped that the 
research design used in this study will facilitate efforts to begin 
identifying some of the most sensitive, and hopefully most valid, 
indices of disaster-related stress. 
Strengths of the Research Design 
When the investigator first began seeking access to agency 
records, the most common response encountered was some variation o f , 
"I don't think there was any change in (index) after the ashfall . " 
Had this study relied, as so many do, on subjective responses about 
the effects of the ashfall, it seems probable that a much different 
picture of the stress-related effects would have resulted. One 
wonders to what degree the same might be true of other disaster 
research . The use of objective indices might suppor t the subjective 
data gathered, or it might illuminate patterns not readily apparent 
in s ubjective data. 
Another perceived strength of this study was the use of both 
pre-disaster and post-disaster data. As noted in the literature 
review, such studies are rare . While this particular study does 
not give any informat ion about individuals, it does show some trends 
in the population as a whole. Such trends would not be apparent 
without the pre-disaster data. This again tends to make research less 
dependent OIl subjective impressions of whe re the change has occurred. 
Another aspect of this study that seems to be a strength is 
the use of multiple indices to assess change. Had the investigator 
54 
limited the indices to just a few "selected" ones, a much different 
picture could have emerged. It would seem appropriate in future 
research of this type to continue the use of multiple variables, 
even when looking at something as comparatively concrete as "illness." 
Not only will it allow for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the effects of disaster, but it may also help identify those indices 
most sensitive to change in a particular area (and thus more valid 
as indicators of stress). 
A final strength of this particular design is that it is, at 
least in theory, readily replicated. There may be practical 
difficulties in getting access to the data, but the research design 
will find ready application to a variety of situatJons. The stressor 
may be any type of disaster, but as long as records are not 
destroyed, it should be possible to do this type of study even many 
years after the the actual event. This again has the advantage of 
eliminating dependence on subjective data and on the vagaries of 
memory [which was one of the things mentioned by Tierney et al ., 
(1979) as a weakness in their own research design) . 
Future Research Needs 
The investigator struggled with a number of questions in the 
course of this research. Out of those struggles came a few 
tentative answers, but even more carne a recognition of areas needing 
furthe r research. There needs to be more studies using objective rather 
than subjective data. There need to be more with pre- and post - disaster 
data, especially in studying the reactions of individuals. There 
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need to be more comparative s tudies using controls , and i nc luding 
object ive as well as subjective data. There is a need for long 
term s tudies about the duration and effects of disaster-related 
str ess , including research on both mental health and physical 
heal th. There is a need to identify any factors which mitigate the 
impac t of s tress on individuals and communities . There is a need f or 
r esearch on the effectiveness of current disaster- relief programs 
in the area of mental health . And finally, there is a need fo r 
research focusing on healthy, adaptive r eac t ions to stress, and 
possible "benefits " of s uccessfully cop ing with a disaster. 
The Need fo r Theory Development 
To this researcher it seems, however, that the necessary 
research, t o be maximally useful, must await the development o f 
theory ; specifi cally, t here seems to be a ne ed t o redefine the 
whole concept of "disaster . II The definit ion given by Marks and 
Fritz (1954), especially as modified by Cis in and Clark (1962), is 
the most comprehensive one the investigator could find in a rather 
extensive l iterature review. But the nature and magnitude of the 
diverse events encompassed in thi s definition of disaster ar e of so 
broad a scope as to render the definition meaningless as a precise 
descriptive statement. What is needed, at the very least, is a 
t ypology of disaster. This would differentiate and classify 
disaster s based on a number of criteria. The fol lowing is o f fe red 
by the investigato r as a framewo r k . Most of the answers would be 
assessed on a continuum. 
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1. Predisaster. (a) unexpectedness - -what was the likelihood 
of a particular type of disaster occurring in the impacted are~ 
(i .e., one does not expect the Teton Dam to collapse and innundate a 
community, but Florida residents would not be sur prised by a 
hurricane, nor would inhabitants of the Plains states be unduly 
surprised by a blizzard of sufficient magnitude to bring everything 
to a standstill) . (b) Suddenness--how much warning was given, or 
was there none at all? (c) How much prior experience had the 
community had with this or other disasters? (d) How much prep aration 
had the community been able to make (training, evacuation plans, 
mobile medical teams, communication centers, emergency supplies of 
food and water, emergency power, etc . )? (e) Had the community 
recently (Within the last N years) undergone a disaster? 
2 . Disaster characteristics . (a) Was the disaster man-made 
o r natural? (b) Was it an extreme instance of a familiar phenomenon 
(extremely high winds), or was it alien (volcanic ashfall, bombing)? 
(c) Was it a single, or a multiple impact disaster [i.e., an eart hquake 
(single impact), or an earthquake with extensive fires (multiple 
impact»)? 
3. During the disaster. (a) Were families together or scattered 
at the time of impact? (b) What was the duration of the disaster 
itself (a 60- second earthquake, or a two - day hur ricane)? (This should 
not be confused with the recovery time after the disaster) , 
(c) What were the individual and family resources for coping with the 
disaster? (d) How many people were injured, and how serious were the 
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injuries? (e) What was the community's experience with death? How 
many: Knew what others died? Knew someone who died? Lost a 
friend? Lost a family member? Saw corpses of those who died? 
Witnessed others ' deaths? Were threatened with death themselves? 
4. Results . (a) What proportion of the community was 
affected by the disaster, bo th directly and indirectly? (b) To 
what extent, and for how long, were normal routines disrupted (i.e.) 
work, school , social, recreational, religious)? (c) To what 
extent, and for how long, were local services disrupted (electric 
power, gas , water, phone, medical, food stores, other stores, etc . )? 
(d) How severely was local economy disrupted (recovery costs, 
uninsured losses, lost business, job losses, etc.)? (e) What was 
the ext ent of disaster related destruction? 
5 . Aftermath. (a) Wha t were the community resources available 
and how long did it take to mobilize them? (b) What external 
resources were available (i.e ., federal disaster aid), and how long 
did it take to mobilize them? (c) How extensive was the need for 
relocation of families, and how long was it necessary? (d) How long 
did the recovery take, and how did the post-disaster state of the 
community compare to the pre-disaster state (were homes destroyed 
beyond repair, did business enterprises or industry leave the local 
area) ? (e) Threat of repetition--what is the likelihood of the 
same community being impacted by a similar disaster in the future? 
A typology of disasters based on a framework similar to the above 
would allow comparison of "types" of disasters by the severity 
rather than the etiology of the disaster. This would also make 
feasible a more realistic appraisal of psychological effects of 
disaster. 
Summary 
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Of the 34 indices used to assess the impact of this particular 
disaster, 20 showed post-disaster increases which met the criterion 
for significance. Nine showed no significant changes, and five 
showed significance decreases. The nonparametric chi square test 
for significance suggested that increases occurred in more indices 
than could be expected by chance alone . The 20 indices showing 
increases in behavior combine in what seems to be solid support for 
the hypothesis. 
To conclusively demonstrate causation however, would require much 
additional research. At the very least, a carefully selected control 
town not impacted by the ashfall would need to be subjected to the 
same type of exhaus t ive survey of "objective indices." Recognizing 
this factor, the original hypothesis has, nonetheless, been 
substantiated. There ._is a correlation between the ashfall and the 
stress- effects manifested afterward. The disaster stands, for the 
present, as the most logical causal factor. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Raw Data: Adams County Counseling 
Services (ACCS) 
Type and Source of Data 
Callan the 24 hour crisis line . This includes all calls of 
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whatever nature coming in on the crisis line (including the " commitment 
investigations" identified as a separate category below) . Data 
came from the 'tMental Health Professional Activity Summaryrr turned in 
after each individual I 5 "on-cal lI! shift, ~.;rhich shifts varied from a 
single day to a whole week at a time (see Table 15 and Figure 2). 
Commitment investigations. These are the formal investigations to 
determine if involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is necessary. 
Each investigation is counted regardless of the outcome. Data were 
extracted from the total crisis calls and came from the "Hental Health 
Professional Activity Summary!! mentioned above (see Table 16 and 
Figure 3). 
Appointments scheduled. Some people made appointments, presumably 
deeming the help necessary, but then failed (for whatever reason) to 
keep the appointment. Other people scheduled frequent appointments, 
but kept relatively few of them. The number of appointments scheduled 
is seen by the investigator as a potentially more realistic indicator 
of stress than those actually kept. More pragmatically perhaps, not 
all the appointments scheduled s tated whether they had been kept , can-
celled, rescheduled or not kept. Only by combing through dozens of 
case records individually could such data have been accurately 
obtained . Data were taken from the appointment books kept by ACCS. 
Those appointments for couples or families were counted as a single 
appointment, unless the individuals were listed separately as coming 
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in at different times . The length of the appointments was not con-
Sidered; those identified as a half hour or less, or those identified 
as several hours in length were all counted as a single appointment. 
The data on appointments does not include the members of an ongoing 
group of nurSing home patients , or the individual contacts with nurSing 
home patients . This nursing home program changed substantially during 
the time period under study (see Table 17and Figure 4). 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
Suicide attempts. Records did not differentiate between those 
commitment investigations done as a result of a suicide attempt and 
those done for other reasons. 
Scope of Catchment Area 
ACCS has two offices , one in the County seat, Ritzville, and one 
in Othello , the major population center . Only those appointments , 
crisis calls, and commiLment investigations clearly originating in the 
Othello area (or from out - of-town clients who saw therapists in 
Othello) were counted. All other were e xcluded. Only the Othello 
appointment book and intake records were used. 
Commen ts 
It should be noted that Washington ' s civil commitment laws we r e 
modified in September of 1980. While this increased the number of 
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investigations which resulted in actuaL commitments, it had l ess effect 
on the total number of investigations undertaken. The investigator did 
not, however, attempt to control for this factor. Data on the "Mental 
Health Professional Activity Summar y" were missing for half of Septem-
ber , 1980. The agency records were either incomplete or lost . The 
investigator made no attempt to interpolate data, although good argu-
ments could be made for doing so. The investigator was unabl e to 
determine if the records for other months were completely accurate, 
but the two missing weeks noted above were by fa r the largest verifi -
able gap in the records. 
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Table I S 
Calls on Mental Health Crisis Line 
Pre-Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 12 1980 
Jun Jun 24 
Jul 3 Jul 32 
Aug IS Aug 26 
Sep 13 Sep 14 
OCt Oct 23 
Nov 13 Nov 25 
Dec 18 Dec 19 
1980 Jan 10 
Feb 12 
Mar II 
Apr 33 
Total 156 Total 163 
Average 13 . 0 Average 23.3 
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Fi gure 2. Calls on mental health crisis line. 
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Table 16 
Psychiatric Commitment Investiga tions 
Pre- Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 1980 
Jun Jun II 
Jul Jul 20 
Aug 12 Aug 21 
Sep 4 Sep 0 
Oct Oct 12 
Nov Nov 
Dec 10 Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 20 
Total 96 Total 75 
Ave rage 8.0 Average 10.7 
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Figure 3 . Psychiatric commi tment i nvestigat ions. 
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Table 17 
Appointments Scheduled at Mental HeaLth Clinic 
Pre-Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 138 1980 
Jun 120 Jun 120 
Jul 102 Jul 112 
Aug 85 Aug 118 
Sep 94 Sep 77 
Oct 98 Oct 152 
Nov 99 Nov 143 
Dec 78 Dec 163 
1980 Jan 122 
Feb 94 
Mar 104 
Apr 110 
Total 1244 Total 885 
Average 103 . 7 Average 126.4 
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Figure 4. Appointments scheduled at mental health clinic . 
Appendix B 
Eaw Dat a : Superior Court For 
Adams County 
Type and Source of Data 
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Criminal cases carne from "Criminal Appearance Docket and Fee Book 
( 7 ) '1 main tained by the court clerk in the County Courthouse in Ritz -
ville (see Table18 and Figure 5 ) . Non- criminal court cases came f rom 
the "Appearance and Execution Docket", Dockets 37 and 38, also main-
tained by the court clerk (see Table19 anrl Figure 6). Divorce peti -
tions are included in the total numb er of non-criminal cases, bu t were 
deemed important enough to also single out for separate graphing (see 
Table 20and Figure 7). 
Data Sought but Unavailabl e 
None . 
Scope of Catchment Area 
This includes all the residents of the county rather than just the 
Othello area . 
Comments 
Al though any given case may have required more than one court 
action during the time period under investigation , each case was 
counted only once, by the date of filing. 
Table 18 
Criminal Cases Filed in Superior Court 
Pre Disaster Post Disaste r 
1979 May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
Total 
Average 
1980 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
4 Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
10 
58 Total 
4.8 Average 
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Fi gure 5. Criminal cases filed in superior court. 
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Table 19 
Non- Criminal Cases Filed 
in Superior Court 
Pre- Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 16 1980 
Jun 24 Jun 15 
Ju l 32 Jul 25 
Aug 20 Aug 19 
Sep 13 Sep 34 
Oct 17 Oct 12 
Nov 16 Nov 17 
Dec 21 Dec 21 
1980 Jan 25 
Feb 21 
Mar 25 
Ap r 18 
Tota l 248 Total 143 
Average 20.7 Average 20 . 4 
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Figure 6. Non-crimi nal cases filed in super ior court . 
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Table 20 
Divorces Filed in Superior Court 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 3 1980 
Jun Jun 4 
Jul 12 Jul 6 
Aug Aug 
Sep Sep 11 
Oct Oct 
Nov 4 Nov 
Dec Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 4 
Mar 13 
Apr 
Total 75 Total 41 
Average 6 . 3 Average 5.9 
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Fi gure 7. Divorces filed in superior court . 
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Appendix C 
Raw Data: Adams County Auditor 
Type and Source of Data 
Compiled from the record of marriage licenses issued, as kept in 
the Auditor 's office, Adams County Courthouse, Ritzville (see Table 21 
a nd Figure 8). 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
None. 
Sco pe of Catchment Area 
All Adams County residents are registered. There was no differ-
entiation by city of residence. 
Commen ts 
The data exclude those few instances where a license was applied 
for but never picked up by the couple . 
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Table 21 
Marriage Licenses Applied for in 
Auditor's Office 
Pre- Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 8 1980 
Jun Jun 
Jul Jul 
Aug Aug 
Sep Sep 10 
Oct Oct 8 
Nov 8 Nov 
Dec 4 Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
Total 62 Total 43 
Average 5.2 Average 6 . 1 
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Figur e 8. Marriage licenses applied for in auditor ' s office. 
Appendix D 
Raw Data : Carnation Company 
Type and Source of Data 
This information was from employee absenteeism data taken from a 
weekly summary for management staff. Carnation is a processing plant 
for potatoes (see Table 22 and Figure 9). 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
Comparable data were unavailable from Chef Reddy, another large 
employer . 
Scope of Catchment Area 
The Carnation Company plant is located in Othello and employs 
local people. 
Comments 
The work force fluctuates according to seasonal need. The 
absenteeism was figured as a percentage of the number of employees 
',...orking for the week. Figures do not include seasonal "down- time" of 
several weeks duration in both summer and winter. In some cases only 
two weeks data were available (before and afte r tldown- time ll ). The 
monthly average for those months was figured based on the two - week 
period. 
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Table 22 
Ca rnation Company Absent e eism 
(Pe rc ent of Work Force) 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 4 . 1 1980 
Ju n 3 . 9 Jun 3 . 6 
Jul 2 . 6 Jul 4 . 8 
Aug 0 . 0 Aug 4.4 
Sep 3.0 Sep 3 . 5 
Oc t 3 .9 Oct 4.2 
Nov 4 . 4 Nov 3.6 
Dec 3.9 Dec 0.0 
1980 Ja n 4.8 
Feb 4.2 
Mar 3 . 7 
Apr 4 . 5 
Total 43.0 Total 24 . 1 
Av erage 3 . 9 Average 4.0 
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Figure 9. Carnation Company absenteeism (per cent of work force). 
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Appendix E 
Raw Data : Department of Social and Health Services 
(State of Washington) 
Type and Source of Data 
The number of child abuse investigations (see Table 23 and Figure 
10) and the number of grants for welfare assistance (see Table 24 and 
Figure 11) both came from records i n the Moses Lake office of the 
Department . 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
Records were incomplete or missing regarding the number of crisis 
calls r esponded to (separate from child abuse investigation), and the 
number of children in foster care each month. 
Scope of Catchment Area 
Al l data refer to the county as a whole. 
Commen ts 
--------
The data on welfare recipients include grants for both financial 
~5sistance and medical assistance . 
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Table 23 
Child Protective Se r vice Investigations 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaste r 
1979 Hay 28 1980 
Jun 22 Jun 27 
Jul 31 Jul 27 
Aug 21 Aug 33 
Sep 29 Sep 32 
Oct 31 Oct 29 
Nov 20 Nov 14 
Dec 31 Dec 17 
1980 Jan 32 
Feb 22 
Mar 36 
Apr 34 
Total 337 Total 179 
Ave rage 28.1 Ave rage 25.6 
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Figu re 10 . Child protective service investigations, 
89 
90 
Table 24 
Welfare Assistance Grants 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 Hay 296 1980 
Jun 289 Jun 293 
Jul 299 Jul 284 
Aug 299 Aug 293 
Sep 289 Sep 295 
Oc t 288 Oct 309 
Nov 282 Nov 302 
Dec 282 Dec 299 
1980 Jan 292 
Feb 310 
Har 328 
Apr 313 
Total 3567 Total 2075 
Average 297.3 Average 296 . 4 
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Figure 11. Welfare assistance grants. 
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Appe n dix F 
Ra w Da ta: Ot h e l lo Communit y Hosp it a l 
T~pe and Source of Data 
This comes from emergency room contacts (see Table 25 and Figure 
12) , new admissions (see Table 26 and Figure 13) , percent of occupancy 
(see Table 27 and Figure 14), and staff sick leave and vacat ion (see 
Table 28 and Figure 15) which were all compiled by the Director of the 
Medica l Records Department . 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
None . 
Scope of Catchmen t Area 
Data include all patients/staff regard less of actual residence. 
However , the hospital generally serves local area residents , and most 
staff are local residents . 
Comments 
The percentage of occupancy was deemed impo r ta nt because the num-
ber of new patients co u ld average out the same in the pr e - and post -
disaster periods, but if the average length of stay pr oved substan-
tially different this would be an important conside ration . Each separ-
ate admissi on was counted even if there was more than one for the same 
patient during the month. 
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Table 25 
Hospital Emergency Room Vis its 
Pre - Disa ster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 385 1980 
Jun 337 Jun 398 
Jul 290 Jul 355 
Aug 255 Aug 347 
Sep 277 Sep 345 
Oct 270 Oct 554 
Nov 259 Nov 367 
Dec 319 Dec 322 
1980 Jan 322 
Feb 330 
Mar 403 
Apr 361 
Total 3808 Total 2688 
Ave rage 317 . 3 Average 384 . 0 
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Figure 12. Hospital emergency room visits 
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Table 26 
Patients Admitted to Hospital 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 Hay 157 1980 
Jun 148 Jun 114 
Jul 156 Jul 121 
Aug 143 Aug 126 
Sep 128 Sep 126 
Oct 131 Oct 169 
Nov 112 Nov 148 
Dec 140 Dec 140 
1980 Ja n 176 
Feb 145 
Mar 181 
Apr 128 
Total 1745 Total 944 
Average 145 . 4 Average 134 . 9 
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Figure 13. Patients admitted t o hospital. 
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Table 27 
Percent Daily Occupancy at Hospital 
Pre- Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 29 . 0 1980 
Jun 30 . 0 Jun 26 . 5 
Jul 30 . 6 Jul 27 . I 
Aug 32 . 3 Aug 26 . 0 
Sep 31.7 Sep 33.7 
Oct 29.3 Oct 41.4 
Nov 26 . 7 Nov 41.4 
Dec 30 . 4 Dec 32 . 4 
1980 Jan 40.9 
F.eb 38 . 7 
Mar 42.3 
Apr 28.9 
Total 390 . 8 To t a l 228 . 5 
Ave rage 32.6 Ave rage 32 . 6 
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Fi gur e 14 . Percent dai ly occupancy at hospital. 
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Table 28 
Hospital Staff Vacation/Sick Leave 
Used (in Hours) 
Pre-Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 634.5 1980 
Jun 648.0 Jun 1075.0 
Jul 1194 . 0 Jul 1228 . 5 
Aug 851.0 Aug 1096.5 
Sep 444 . 0 Sep 761.0 
Oct 785 .5 Oct 659.0 
Nov 769 . 0 Nov 699.0 
Dec 722.0 Dec 1156.0 
1980 Jan 510 . 0 
Feb 361. 0 
Mar 483 . 0 
Ap r 900 . 5 
Total 830 2 . 5 Total 6675 . 0 
Average 691. 9 Aver age 953 . 6 
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Figure 15 . Hospita l staff vacation/sick leave used ( in hours) 
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Appendix G 
Raw Data: Adams County Juvenile Court 
Type and Source of Data 
The number of new referrals during each month was taken from the 
Juvenile Court Administrator's annual report to the Juvenile Court 
Judge for Adams County (see Table 29 and Figure 16). 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
The total number of contacts with juveniles could not be deter-
mined without combing through each individual file. 
Scope of Catchment Area 
Records include any juvenile living (or picked up) in Adams County 
at the time of the referral. 
Comments 
--------
The repo r t to the Juvenile Court Judge indicated that in 1979 61 . 3 
percent of the juveniles referred lived in Othello, with 66 . 6 percent 
in 1980 living in Othello. However, an additio nal 22.4 percent in 
1979, and 20 . 3 percent in 1980 were non-county residents who could have 
been picked up or living anywhere in the county , including Othello. 
For this reason it was deemed inappropriate to try and isolate or 
extrapolate the Othello area referrals from the monthly totals. 
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Table 29 
Juveniles Served by Adams 
County Juvenile Court 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 Hay 19 1980 
Jun 35 Jun 30 
Jul 30 Jul 33 
Aug 40 Aug 15 
Sep 23 Sep 25 
Oct 24 Oct 23 
Nov 11 Nov 16 
Dec 22 Dec 16 
1980 Jan 28 
Feb 19 
Nar 26 
Apr 27 
Total 304 Total 158 
AVA:rage 25 . 3 Average 2:1.6 
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Fi gure 16. Juveniles served by Adams County Juvenile Court. 
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Appendix H 
Raw Data : Columbia Basin Health Associat i on 
Tvpe and Source of Data 
From computer print-outs three diagnostic groupings were identi -
fied and counted : mental illness, psychosomatic illness, and illness 
caused or aggravated by stress (see Table 3 0). From another computer 
printout came the total number of patient contacts . From July through 
December, 1979 there were 17,018 patient contacts compared to 16 , 970 
from Ja nuar y 1980 through June 1980 and 16 , 711 from July through Decem-
ber 1980 . I n the pre- disaster period (July 1979 through J une 1980), 
this average d out to be 2,834 patient contacts pe r month . From Jul y 
through December 1980, there was an average of 2 , 785 patient contacts 
per month . Staff sick leave and vacation time we re taken from person-
nel records (see Table 31 and Figure 17) . 
Table 3 0 
Number of Diagnoses at Medical Clinic 
Pre - Month Post - Month 
Tye e of Illness Dis aster Avg Disaster Avg 
Mental Illness 236 14.8 298 49 . 7 
Psychosomatic Illness 500 31.3 599 99 . 8 
Stress Aggravated Illness 714 44 . 6 798 133 . 0 
1 05 
Table 31 
Medica 1 Clinic Staff Vacation/Sick Leave 
Used (in Hours) 
Pre - Disaste r Post - Disaster 
1979 May 206 1980 
Jun 263 Jun 276 
Jul 486 Jul 701 
Aug 881 Aug 584 
Sep 436 Sep 705 
Oct 571 Oct 522 
Nov 315 Nov 148 
Dec 463 Dec 598 
1980 Jan 373 
Feb 162 
Mar 318 
Apr 355 
Tota 1 4829 Total 3534 
Average 402.4 Average 504 . 9 
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Figure 17. Medical clinic s taf f va cation/s ick leave used (in hours ). 
Da ta So ught but Unavailable 
The other medical clinic in Othe llo d i d not have all of their 
rec ords computeriz ed and accessible until well into the time period 
under study . 
Scope of Catchmen t Area 
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Includes records from Othello and from two small satellite clinics 
in towns 25 o r so miles from Othello. 
Comments 
Diagnoses we re lis ted on the comput er printout using the diagnos-
tic codes from the International Class ification of Diseases, 8th and 
9th editions (WHO, 1968; WHO, 1978). The investigator's concern 
was notwich specific illnesses, but with groups or classes of related 
illnesses . In the mental illness g roup, organic psychoses and mental 
reta rdati on were not included in the data. The other groupings of 
i l lnesses are those often identified in psychia tric literature as 
psychosomatic , and those seriously aggravated by stress or emotional 
distu rbance (Fre edman, et a1., 1975; Gregory & Smeltzer, 1977; Kutash 
& Schlesinge r, 1980; Leukel, 1972; Haslach, 1976; Selye, 1974, 1976a, 
L976b; Wittkower & \{arnes, 1977; and Woody, 1980) . 
There were some difficulties in collecting this body of data . 
Because the medical clinic did not need all the monthly printouts, 
the re were segments of the data either missing or destroyed. It was 
therefo r e impossible to list totals for each month . There were enough 
printouts intac t however, to give some usable data. The investigator 
deemed such medical data far too important to disca rd simply because 
it didn't quite f it the fo rmat being used for data collection. 
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Baseline data are for the time period f rom January 1, 1979 through 
Ap ril 30 , 1980. The post disaster data are from July 1, 1980 through 
December 31, 1980. During L980 the clinic was in the process of con-
verting their diagnostic codes from ICO- 8 to lCo- 9. This necessitated 
two separate computer printouts for some months. The investigator 
matched the ICD-8 and ICD- 9 codes for each diagnosis and combined the 
two for the figures in the post - disaster data. Since there were some 
instances where the same patient number appeared under both coding sys-
tems (ICO- 8 and ICD-9) the investigator went through the patient num-
bers under e ach individual diagnostic code for both systems and elimi-
nated those few instances of double listing. The resultant combi ned 
total thus gives an accurate count of the total number of patients 
diagnosed as having a particular illness. In all the data the numbers 
given represent individual patients, they do not represent the number 
of contacts with patients . Each person is counted only o nce during 
the year for a particular diagnosis, even though he may be seen many 
times in the course of treating the illness. The same patient may , 
however, have more than one diagnosis among those included in this 
study. 
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Appendix I 
Ra w Data : The Outlook 
Type and Source of Data 
The Outlook is a weekly newspaper cove ring local news and events . 
Data on auto accidents (see Table 32 and Figure 18), and district court 
cases (see Tab les 33 , 34,35 and Figures 19, 20, 21 ) are published 
based on records of the Sta te Highway Patrol and the Othe llo Dis tr ict 
Cour t r espect ively . Data on death rat es (see Table 36 and Figure 22 ) 
came f r om t he obituary co lumn a nd included o nly current residents, not 
the (infre quent) obituaries of former residents. 
Data So ught but Unavailable 
None . 
Scope of Catchment Area 
Ot hello and local area . 
Comme nt s 
None . 
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Tab Ie 32 
Auto Accidents 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 1980 
Jun Jun 
Jul Jul 8 
Aug 12 Aug 4 
Sep Sep 
Oct Oct 3 
Nov lJ Nov 4 
Dec 8 Dec 4 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 4 
Apr 4 
Total 74 Tota l 34 
Average 6.2 Average 4 . 9 
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Figure 18 . Auto accidents 
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Table 33 
District Court DWI' 5 (Driving 
While Intoxicated) 
Pre -D isas ter Post - Disaster 
1979 Hay 14 1980 
Jun 12 Jun 10 
Jul 12 Jul 17 
Aug 4 Aug 
Sep Sep 6 
Oct Oct 
Nov 17 Nov II 
Dec Dec 
1980 Jan 13 
Feb 
Har II 
Apr 
Total III Total 63 
Average 9 . 3 Average 9 . 0 
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Figure 19 . Jistrict court JwI~s (driving while intox i cated) . 
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Table 34 
District Court Cases Involving Alcohol 
(Exc luding DlH ' 5) 
Pre-Disas t er Post - Disaster 
1979 Nay 14 1980 
Jun 19 Jun 
J u l 8 J ul 
Aug 14 Aug 
Sep Sep 11 
Oct Oct 19 
Nov Nov 13 
Dec 11 Dec 7 
1980 Jan 6 
Feb 9 
Mar 
Apr 
Total 108 Total 69 
Average 9 . 0 Ave rage 9 . 9 
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Figure 20. District court cases involving alcohol (excluding DWI ' s) . 
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Table 35 
All District Court Cases 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 258 1980 
Jun 209 Jun 189 
Jul 176 Jul 268 
Aug 186 Aug 228 
Sep 197 Sep 228 
Oct 212 Oct 335 
Nov 246 Nov 259 
Dec 165 Dec 229 
1980 Jan 270 
Feb 280 
Mar 237 
Apr 185 
Total 2621 Total 1736 
Average 218 . 4 Average 248.0 
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Fi gure 21. All di s trict court cas es. 
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Table 36 
Obituaries in Local Newspaper 
Pre- Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 1980 
Jun Jun 
Jul Jul 
Aug Aug 
Sep Sep 
Oct Oct 8 
Nov Nov 6 
Dec 4 Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 6 
Apr 
Total Sl Total 36 
Average 4.3 Average 5. l 
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Figur e 22. Obituar ies in l ocal newspaper. 
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Appendix J 
Raw Data: Ot hello Police De p a rtment 
Type and Source of 9ata 
All data on the types of problems carne from monthly summaries of 
the IIForm l's " completed by the officers after each official contact or 
response to a call (see Tables 37 - 46 and Figures 23 - 32). The jail cen-
sus was included as part of the same monthly summaries of police 
activity. 
Data Sought but Unavailable 
None . 
Scope of Catchment Area 
Within Othello city limits. 
Comments 
None . 
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Table 37 
Police Fo rm l's for "Assault" 
Pre - Disa ster Post - Disaster 
1979 Hay 0 1980 
Jun 4 Jun 0 
J ul Jul 4 
Aug Aug 
Se p 3 Sep 
Oct 4 Oct 
Nov 4 Nov 
De c 0 Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 4 
Apr 
To t al 31 Total 23 
Average 2.6 Ave rage 3 . 3 
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Figure 23. Police form l ' s fo r "assault" , 
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Table 38 
Po 1 ice Form 1'5 for "Liquor Laws l ' 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 6 1980 
Jun 6 Jun 4 
Jul 8 Jul 4 
Aug Aug 9 
Sep 4 Sep 14 
Oct Oct 9 
Nov 4 Nov 6 
Dec Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 5 
Mar 6 
Apr 
Total 58 Total 48 
Ave rage 4.8 Ave rage 6.9 
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Fi gu r e 24 . Police form lI s fo r "liquor laws " 
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Table 39 
Police Form 1'5 for IIDWI's" 
(Driving (;hite Intoxicated) 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 12 1980 
Jun 8 Jun 
Jul 4 Jul 
Aug 4 Aug 
Sep 11 Sep 
Oct Oct 8 
Nov Nov 6 
Dec Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 8 
Total 75 Total 34 
Average 6 . 3 Average 4.9 
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Figure 25. Police form 1' 5 for "DWr's" (driving while intoxicated) 
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Tab Ie 40 
Police Form l's for I1Disorder ly Conduct" 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 28 1980 
Jun 23 Jun 20 
Jul 22 Jul 16 
Aug 23 Aug 18 
Sep 11 Sep 16 
Oct 9 Oct 20 
Nov 9 Nov 21 
Dec 20 Dec 19 
1980 Jan 10 
Feb 13 
Mar 16 
Apr 19 
Total 203 Total 130 
Average 16 . 9 Average 18.6 
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Figure 26. Police form lIs for "disorderly conduct" 
Tab Le 41 
Police Form l's fo r "Domestic Violence" 
Pre-Disaster 
1979 May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
No v 
Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
Total 
Average 
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Post - Disaster 
1980 
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Jul 
Aug 
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Total 
Average 
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74 
10 . 6 
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Figure 27. Police form lis for "domestic violence ll 
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Table 42 
Police Form l' 5 for "Vandalism/ 
Malicious Mischief" 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 1980 
Jun 11 Jun 17 
Jul 11 Jul 12 
Aug 13 Aug 21 
Sep 10 Sep 
Oct 13 Oct 16 
Nov 10 Nov 14 
Dec 21 Dec 12 
1980 Jan 6 
Feb 8 
Mar 17 
Apr 8 
Total 137 Tota 1 99 
Average 11.4 Average 14 . 1 
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Figure 28 . Police form lis for "vandalism/malicious mischief" 
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Tabl e 43 
Total Number of Polic e form lIs Completed 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 391 1980 
Jun 316 Jun 381 
Jul 369 Jul 363 
Aug 320 Aug 424 
Sep 310 Sep 310 
Oct 284 Oct 345 
Nov 249 Nov 325 
Dec 286 Dec 275 
1980 Jan 292 
Feb 255 
Mar 262 
Apr 323 
Total 3657 Total 2423 
Average 304.8 Average 346 . 1 
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Figure 29 . Total number of police form l's completed 
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Table 44 
Police "Breatha lyzer" Tests for 
Alcoho l Intoxication 
Pre-Disaster Post - Disast e r 
1979 May 17 1980 
Jun 16 Jun 9 
Jul. Jul 14 
Aug 12 Aug 
Sep 19 Sep 14 
Oct 20 Oct 13 
No v 12 No v 8 
Dec 15 Dec 8 
1980 Jan 0 
Feb 6 
Mar 15 
Apr II 
Total 148 Total 75 
Average 12 . 3 Average 10 . 7 
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Figure 30. Police "breathalyzer" tests fo r alcohol intoxica t ion 
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Tab Ie 45 
Juvenile Criminal "Bookings " by City Police 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 10 1980 
Jun 14 Jun 
Jul Jul 
Aug Aug 9 
Sep 11 Sep 
Oct Oct 8 
Nov Nov 9 
Dec Dec 
1980 Jan 
Feb 11 
Bar 
Apr 11 
Total 97 Total 58 
Average 8 . 1 Average 8 . 3 
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Figure 31. Juvenile criminal "bookings" by city po l ice 
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Table 46 
Adul t Criminat "Bookings" by City Police 
Pre-Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 35 1980 
Jun 26 Jun 29 
Jul 25 Jul 35 
Aug 26 Aug 39 
Sep 29 Sep 42 
Oc t 25 Oct 44 
Nov 31 Nov 35 
Dec 16 Dec 19 
1980 Jan 31 
Feb 28 
Mar 29 
Apr 39 
Total 340 Total 243 
Average 28 . 3 Average 34.7 
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Figure 32. Adult criminal "bookings" by c ity po l ice 
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Appendix K 
Raw Data: Comm unit y Alcohol Center 
Type and Source of Data 
The clients served by the Community Alcohol Center includes the 
number of people assisted in any of three programs : Information and 
Referral, Alcohol Information School , and outpa tient counseling. Data 
came from the Director's annual report to the Co unty Commissioners (see 
Tab Ie 47 and Figure 33) . 
Data Sought but Unavailabl e 
None. 
Scope of Catchme nt Area 
The catchment area included all of Adams Count y . 
Comments 
----
Data do not include those people attending the Alcoholics Anony -
mous group unofficially affiliated with the Cente r. 
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Table 47 
Clients Served by Community Alcohol Center 
Pre - Disaster Post - Disaster 
1979 May 57 1980 
Jun 62 Jun 55 
Jul 59 Jul 62 
Aug 52 Aug 59 
Sep 47 Sep 55 
Oct 46 Oct 54 
Nov 50 Nov 63 
Dec 42 Dec 43 
1980 Jan 35 
Feb 32 
~ar 36 
Apr 41 
Total 559 Total 391 
Average 46.6 Average 55.9 
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Figure 33 . Clients served by community alcohol center 
